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Technological development will most likely play an important role in curbing growth in 
greenhouse gas emissions. It is therefore important to incorporate factors influencing 
technological change in climate policy analyses. This paper studies climate policy when 
there are technology spillovers between countries, and there is no instrument that 
(directly) corrects for these externalities. The lack of an appropriate instrument reflects 
that R&D expenditures in a country are difficult to verify by other countries. We show 
that without an international agreement, the non-cooperative outcome will have too 
much emissions and too little R&D expenditures compared with the social optimum. 
While the non-cooperative equilibrium depends on whether countries use tradable 
quotas or carbon taxes as their domestic instruments for controlling emissions, all 
countries are better off in the tax case than in the quota case. Next we study two types of 
international climate agreements with full participation. One is a Kyoto type of 
agreement where each country is assigned a specific number of internationally tradable 
quotas. In the second type of agreement a common carbon tax should be used 
domestically in all countries. We show that none of the cases satisfy the conditions for 
the social optimum. Even if the total number of quotas is set so that the quota price is 
equal to the Pigovian level, R&D investments will be lower than what is socially 
optimal in the Kyoto case, whereas with a harmonized domestic carbon tax R&D 
expenditures could even be too high. Finally we examine the case in which there is an 
incomplete agreement, i.e. some countries have not signed the agreement. We 
demonstrate that there is virtually no difference between this case and the case of full 
cooperation. 
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Most scientists would agree that if dramatic future climate changes are to be avoided, 
there must be a significant reduction in worldwide greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions 
compared with the “business as usual” (BAU) development of emissions. If all of 
these reductions were to take place only through existing technologies, costs of 
reducing GHG emissions may become very high. Due to increasing abatement costs, 
technological development will most likely play an important role in curbing growth 
in emissions. It is therefore important to incorporate factors influencing technological 
change in climate policy analyses. 
 
During the last decade, several articles have studied interactions between endogenous 
technological change and environmental policy, see e.g. Jaffe et al. (2002) and 
Löschel (2002) for overviews. Several of these studies are particularly relevant for 
issues related to climate policy. However, many of these disregard interactions 
between countries, and simply consider the world as one unit with a central planner
1. 
The present paper focuses explicitly on interactions between countries, and is in this 
respect related to the studies by e.g. Ploeg and de Zeeuw (1994), Xepapadeas (1995), 
Katsoulacos (1997), Buonanno et al. (2000a,2001), Rosendahl (2002). 
 
In our study there are two types of interactions. Firstly, R&D efforts in one country, 
which raise the technology level of the country, are also beneficial for other countries 
through technology spillovers. This feature of our model is shared by the studies 
referred to above
2. Secondly, increased emissions of GHG in one country are harmful 
also for other countries.  
 
With two types of externalities - positive externalities due to technology spillovers 
and negative environmental externalities of GHG emissions  - standard economic 
theory suggests that two instruments should be used in order to reach the social 
optimum. While GHG emissions can be controlled efficiently through e.g. carbon 
                                                 
1 See e.g. Carraro (1998), Fischer (2000), Goulder and Mathai (2000), Goulder and Schneider (1999), 
Nordhaus (2000), Rasmussen (2001). 
2  Rosendahl (2002) does not include R&D expenditures in his model. Instead, he assumes that 
technology levels are endogenized through learning by doing effects (or, more accurately, through 
“learning by abatement” effects).    1
taxes or tradable permits, there is virtually measure that (directly) correct for 
technology spillovers between countries.  
 
The lack of an instrument reflects that the magnitude of R&D expenditures in a 
country is difficult to verify by other countries. If a country is required - through an 
international agreement - to have more R&D expenditures than what is individually 
rational for the country, it will be relatively easy for the country to have less R&D 
than required by the agreement, but to report other expenditures as R&D activities. 
The purpose of the present paper is therefore to study climate policy when there are 
technology spillovers between countries, but there is no instrument to correct for these 
externalities. In particular, we compare the properties of different international 
climate agreements when the positive externalities from R&D are not regulated 
through the climate agreement.  
 
None of the studies referred to above have the same focus as ours. The focus of Ploeg 
and de Zeeuw (1994) and Xepapadeas (1995) is a comparison of the non-cooperative 
equilibrium with the first best optimum. However, none of these studies demonstrate 
that the non-cooperative equilibrium depends on what policy instruments countries 
use to reduce emissions. This is a topic discussed in Section 3 of our paper.  
 
Buonanno et al. (2001) make a simulation study calculating the costs of the Kyoto 
agreement under various assumptions about technological development, while   
Buonanno et al. (2000a,b) analyze the effects of restricting free trade of quotas under 
the same type of agreement. Similar analyses have been done by Millok (2000) and 
Kemfert (2001). None of these studies compare a Kyoto type of agreement with an 
agreement that specifies policies (in stead of emissions) for each country. This is a 
topic discussed in Section 4 of our paper. 
 
In our analysis, each country is faced by three types of costs; R&D expenditures, 
abatement costs and environmental costs, the latter being dependent on the sum of 
emissions from all countries. Each country seeks to minimize the sum of these costs.  
While R&D investments are costly, increased R&D improves the technology of the 
country and lowers abatement costs (both absolute and marginal abatement costs at 
any given level of abatement). Improved technology also lowers BAU emissions of   2
the country. A country can also reduce its emissions - and hence its environmental 
costs – directly through abatement, which is defined as costly activities that reduce 
emissions using known technologies. 
 
Throughout the paper we assume that in each country R&D expenditures are 
controlled directly by the government. This could be interpreted as follows: Due to 
technology spillovers – both between countries and between domestic firms - the 
incentives for any particular firm for undertaking R&D expenditures are very weak. 
The government must therefore finance the R&D activities, even though R&D 
(primarily) takes place in private firms. The government thus controls R&D 
expenditures through its funding of them, and hence in the analyses R&D 
expenditures are determined in a non-cooperative manner.  
 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we present the model in 
more detail and derive the social optimum. In order to keep the analysis as simple as 
possible, we use a static framework, thus ignoring, for example, the fact that GHG 
emissions are stock pollutants. Moreover, all types of uncertainties – like rate of 
return on R&D investments - are disregarded. Finally, to keep formulations simple we 
only consider one type of GHG, namely CO2. None of our results are affected by the 
latter simplification. 
 
The case of no international agreement is studied in Section 3. Without an agreement, 
in each country abatement, as well as R&D expenditures, are determined non-
cooperatively. Obviously, given the nature of the two inter-country externalities, a 
non-cooperative equilibrium will have too much emissions and too little R&D 
expenditures compared with the social optimum. We also find that the non-
cooperative equilibrium depends on whether countries use tradable quotas or a carbon 
tax as their domestic instrument for controlling emissions. However, all countries are 
better off in the tax case than in the quota case. In Section 3.3 we demonstrate that if 
the type policy instrument and the magnitude of the instrument (i.e. the amount of 
quotas or the rate of the carbon tax) are chosen simultaneously, there are multiple 
Nash equilibria. If, however, the game runs over two-stages where each country 
chooses its instrument in the first stage, the unique sub-game perfect equilibrium is 
for all countries to use a carbon tax to control CO2 emissions.   3
 
In Section 4 we turn to the case of international climate agreements with full 
participation. Although there are positive externalities from R&D expenditures, we 
assume that such expenditures are not regulated through the climate agreement, and 
are thus determined non-cooperatively (see discussion above). We consider two types 
of international agreements. One is a Kyoto type of agreement, i.e. an agreement 
where each country is assigned a specific number of internationally tradable quotas. 
Moreover, countries decide themselves how to implement the appropriate emissions 
domestically. The second type of climate agreement dictates that a common policy 
should be used domestically in all countries. In our simple model this policy is a 
carbon tax set at a common level.  
 
Section 4.3 gives a comparison of these two types of agreements. Not surprisingly, 
none of the cases satisfy the conditions for the social optimum. Even if the total 
number of quotas is set so that the quota price is equal to the Pigovian level (the sum 
of marginal environmental costs), R&D investments will be lower than what is 
socially optimal in the Kyoto case, whereas R&D expenditures could even be too high 
with a harmonized domestic carbon tax.  
 
In Section 5 we examine the case in which there is an incomplete agreement, i.e. some  
countries have not signed the agreement (the non-cooperating countries). If there is no 
abatement in the non-cooperating countries, there is virtually no difference between 
this case and the case of full cooperation. Hence, R&D expenditures will differ from 
the first best optimum for the cooperating countries, and for sure be too low when the 
signatories use tradable permits.  
 
Next we study the case in which the cooperating countries can purchase CDM 
(“Clean Development Mechanism”) quotas from the non-cooperating countries. The 
price of CDM quotas is assumed equal to the marginal abatement cost in the non-
coopering countries. Increased R&D in the cooperating countries will then through 
technology spillovers (to the non-signatories) lower the price of CDM quotas, as a 
higher technology level lowers marginal costs of abatement (per assumption). On the 
other hand, increased purchase of CDM quotas will raise the quota price. This 
mechanism is taken into account in the first best optimum for the group of   4
cooperating countries. Hence, in order to keep the price of CDM quotas low, the 
group of cooperating countries acts as a monopsonist towards the non-cooperating 
countries and purchase less CDM quotas, that is, less abatement in the non-
cooperative countries than full cost-effectiveness would suggest. 
 
Comparing the first best optimum of the group of cooperating countries with the case 
of an incomplete Kyoto type of agreement with CDM quotas, as before the Kyoto 
type is inferior, having too low technology levels. The reasons are similar to the case 
of full participation in the climate agreement. In fact, in the present case there is even 
a further source of distortion: A cooperating country takes the price of CDM quotas as 
given (provided the country is “small”), and therefore neglects the beneficial effect of 
its R&D expenditures on the price of CDM quotas. Section 6 sums up our main 
findings and point at some extensions.  
 
 
2   The basic model and the social optimum 
According to Rivera-Batiz and Romer (1991) there are two main channels of 
technological diffusion. First, direct international learning about foreign technological 
knowledge. Second, technology diffuses internationally through foreign intermediate 
goods; employing foreign intermediate goods involves the implicit usage of the 
design knowledge that was created with the R&D investment of the foreign inventor. 
Because the latter type of diffusion might be related to international trade and foreign 
direct investment, it is disregarded in the present paper as we focus solely on 
innovation and diffusion of green technology.  
 
In order to focus on the relationship between climate policy and technology 
spillovers, we simplify the modelling of R&D as much as possible. First, we neglect 
the dynamic aspects of R&D. Second, there are no patents, and third all uncertainties 
are neglected. We assume that the technology level in a country  i,i=1,2,,,m, 
depends on the amount invested in R&D in that country,  i x , and also the investments 
in R&D undertaken in all other countries. However, technological diffusion is not   5
perfect, only part of the R&D investments undertaken in other countries (01 g <<) 
are beneficial for country i.






=+ ￿   (1) 
This way of modelling international knowledge spillovers is very similar to the 
approach used in the literature referred to above. The assumptions used by Ploeg and 
de Zeeuw (1994) and Xepapadeas (1995) correspond to the limiting case of  1 g = , 
while the assumptions used by e.g. Buonanno et al. (2000a,b, 2001) and Rosendahl 
(2002) correspond to  1 g < . 
 
In the absence of any explicit abatement activities, emissions in each country are 
assumed to depend o nly on the technology level of the country. Denoting this 
business as usual (BAU) emission level in country  i by  () ii Ny, we assume that 
' 0 i N £  and 
'' 0 i N ‡ . Actual emissions are equal to BAU emissions minus abatement, 
i.e.  
  () iiii ENyA =-   (2) 
 
Abatement costs are assumed to depend both on the level of abatement and the 







¶ => , 
'' 0 iAA C > , 
' 0 iy C < , 
'' 0 iyy C > , 
'' 0 iAy C <  and 
''''''2 ()0 iAAiyyiAy CCC ->  (i.e. the Ci  functions are strictly convex). 
 
Finally, in each country environmental damage depends on the sum of total 
emissions;  () ij
j
DE ￿ , and we assume that these functions are increasing and convex. 
 
Assuming that there are no restrictions on transfers between countries, the social level 
of abatement is found from minimizing total costs (aggregated over all countries), 
including environmental costs, i.e. by minimizing  
  
                                                 
3  Keller (2002) finds that technology to a substantial degree is local, not global, as the benefits from 
spillovers are declining with distance. In the present paper we simplify by assuming that for each 
country, the international diffusion parameter ? does not differ between all the other countries. None of 
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CD =￿   (5) 
According to (4) at the margin increased costs of R&D in a country (1) should be 
balanced against its total benefits. These benefits are of two kinds. First, increased 
R&D investments in a country reduce abatement costs for the country (
'
iy C - ) and for 






- ￿ ). Second, even with 
unchanged abatement emissions will be lowered in the country undertaking the R&D 
investment (
'











D ￿ , that is, 
marginal costs of emissions aggregated over all countries. Moreover, according to (5) 
marginal costs of abatement (with respect to abatement;
'
iA C ) should equal the 




D ￿ ). 
 
3  No international agreement 
In this section we assume that there is no international agreement. Instead, each 
country determines investments in R&D and abatement by balancing costs against 
benefits following from reduced emissions of CO2. While investments in R&D are 
controlled by the government and thus determined directly, the government does not 
control abatement directly. Instead, domestic measures are imposed in order to 
achieve the desired level of abatement. We assume that the countries collectively 
                                                 
4 Throughout the paper, we assume that the non-negativity constraints xi ‡ 0 and Ai ‡ 0 are not binding, 
unless the opposite is explicitly stated.   7
decide on type of domestic instrument for controlling emissions, and that all countries 
are committed to this choice. 
 
In Section 3.1 we study the case in which each country is committed to use domestic 
tradable emission quotas to reach its desired abatement level. The second case we 
study (Section 3.2) is the one in which each country is committed to use a domestic 
carbon tax. In this case the policy variable is thus not the sum of domestic emissions, 
but a domestic tax that, along with the level of technology, determines abatement. In 
both cases we find the Nash equilibrium, assuming that all decisions are taken 
simultaneously, and that each country minimises its total costs. Finally, multiple Nash 
equilibria are discussed in Section 3.3. 
 
3.1  Domestic tradable quotas as the chosen policy instrument 
Assume that the government in each country makes a simultaneous decision about the 
level of the country’s R&D expenditures and the country’s total emissions. This total 
emission level is thereafter distributed to the private agents of the economy through 
tradable permits. The game considered in this section is thus a game in which country 
i chooses its emissions and its R&D expenditures to minimize 
   




+-++ ￿￿   (6) 
 
taking emission levels and R&D expenditures in other countries as given. The first 
order conditions to this minimization problem can be written as 
 
 




iAi CD =   (8) 
 
Relations (7) and (8) determine the Nash equilibrium, that is, abatement levels and 
investments in R&D in all countries. Comparing this with the social optimum given 
by (4) and (5), we immediately see that there are three differences. First, in the Nash 
equilibrium each country valuates changes in emissions only through  its marginal   8
environmental cost (
'




D ￿ ) as 
in the social optimum. The second and third difference is that in the Nash equilibrium 
each country ignores the impact of its R&D investment on abatement costs in other 
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- ￿￿ in 
the social optimum). 
 
 
3.2  A carbon tax as the chosen policy instrument 
We now assume that the government in each country uses a domestic tax  i t  in order 
to control domestic abatement. The government in each country makes a simultaneous 
decision about the level of the country’s R&D expenditures and the country’s total 
emissions. Once all R&D expenditures and tax rates are determined, private agents in 
each country will then choose emissions so that marginal costs of abatement are equal 
to the tax: 
 
 
' (,) iAiii CAy t =   (9) 
 
From  (9) we find that abatement in a country depends on the tax imposed in the 
country and the technology level of the country:  
 
  (,) iiii AAy t =   (10) 
 
where our assumptions of the abatement cost function imply that 
'' 0,0 iiy AA t >> . 
 
When governments control abatement through a domestic t ax, the government 
chooses the tax and R&D expenditures to minimize 
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The first order conditions are now given by (8) and  
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Comparing this with the social optimum given by (4) and (5), we immediately see that 
there are three differences. First, just like the case where countries use quotas as their 
instruments, in the Nash equilibrium, each country valuates changes in emissions only 
through its own marginal environmental cost (
'





D ￿ ) as in the social optimum. The second difference is that 
in the Nash equilibrium, each country ignores the direct impact of its R&D investment 






- ￿ ). 
Like in the social optimum increased R&D investment in a country will lower BAU 
emissions in all countries. On the other hand, in the Nash equilibrium each country 
takes into account that its own R&D expenditures will (in addition) have a positive 





„ ￿ ; this term does not appear in the 
first order conditions for the social optimum. 
 
 
3.3 A comparison of the two non-cooperative equilibria 
We wish to compare the two types of non-cooperative equilibria, which we denote the 
quota equilibrium (section 3.1) and the tax equilibrium (section 3.2). Condition (8) is 
valid in both equilibria. However, the conditions for optimal R&D differ: Comparing   10






-+ ￿￿ ) 
compared with  (7). The interpretation of this term is that when tax rates in all 
countries are given, increased R&D investment in a country will reduce emission 
levels in other countries because of technological diffusion. This additional  term 
implies that the marginal benefits of R&D investments for each country increase, and 
hence the incentives for R&D expenditures increase. Since BAU emissions and 
abatement costs are lower the higher are R&D expenditures, we therefore expect 
emissions to be lower under the tax equilibrium than under the quota equilibrium. In 
the Appendix we prove that this intuition turns out to hold, i.e., we have the following 
result:  
 
Proposition 1: Total emissions are lower in the non-cooperative tax equilibrium than 
in the non-cooperative quota equilibrium. 
 
Although total emissions are lower in the non-cooperative tax equilibrium than in the 
non-cooperative quota equilibrium, this does not necessarily imply that R&D 
expenditures in all countries are higher in the t ax equilibrium than in the quota 
equilibrium. In the Appendix 1 we prove the following slightly weaker result: 
 
Proposition 2: For countries that have linear environmental damage functions (i.e. 
'' 0 i D = ), technology levels and abatement levels are higher in the non-cooperative tax 
equilibrium than in the non-cooperative quota equilibrium. Hence for these countries, 
emissions are lower in the non-cooperative tax equilibrium than in the non-
cooperative quota equilibrium. 
 
To see why we need the assumption of linear environmental damage functions in 
Proposition 2, assume all countries except country  1  have  linear environmental 
damage functions. For country 1, assume that 
'
1 D  is zero when the sum of emissions is 
below some threshold E*, and positive when the sum of emissions exceeds E*. From 
Proposition 2 we know that emissions in all other countries are lower in the tax 
equilibrium than in the quota equilibrium. Assume therefore that the sum of emissions 
from countries 2,..,m exceeds E* in the quota equilibrium, but are lower than E* in the   11
tax equilibrium. Country  1 will therefore have positive abatement in the quota 
equilibrium, but zero abatement in the tax equilibrium.
5 For this case it is thus not true 
that all countries have higher abatement levels in the tax equilibrium than in the quota 
equilibrium. 
 
Notice that although technology levels are higher in all countries with linear 
environmental damage functions in the tax equilibrium than in the quota equilibrium, 
we cannot conclude that R&D expenditures are higher in these countries in the tax 
equilibrium than in the quota equilibrium. This can be seen by considering the 2-
country case. For this case it follows from  (1) that 
2
112 ()(1) xyy gg =-- and 
2
221 ()(1) xyy gg =-- . Even if both countries have linear environmental damage 
cost functions, we cannot rule out that as we move from the quota to the tax 
equilibrium, y2 increases much more than y1: The change in yi depends on the second 
order derivative 
''
iAA C  (see eq. (A4) in Appendix 1 for details), and these second order 
derivatives may differ strongly between countries. If y2 increases much more than y1  
as we move from the quota to the tax equilibrium, R&D expenditures in county 1 will 
be lower in the tax equilibrium than in the quota equilibrium. 
 
According to Proposition 2, technology levels are highest in all countries in the tax 
equilibrium provided that all 
'' 0 i D = . Hence, if 
'' 0 i D =  and all countries are identical, 
the common technology level is highest in the tax equilibrium, and thus R&D 
expenditures are highest in the tax equilibrium. It turns out that this result holds also 
for 
'' 0 i D >  if all countries are identical: 
 
Proposition 3: If countries are identical, R&D expenditures are higher in the non-
cooperative tax equilibrium than in the non-cooperative quota equilibrium. 
 
Proof: We k now from Proposition 1 that with 
TQ EE < , implying 
'' ()()




AA CAyCAy £ . Assume 
TQ yy £ . From the properties of the 
                                                 
5 Country 1 will also have x1=0 in the tax equilibrium, and in this case we may have a corner solution 
so that the “=” in (13) is replaced by “>” for i=1.   12
abatement cost functions this implies 
TQ AA £ . Taken together, the two last 
inequalities imply 
TQ EE ‡ , which contradicts Proposition 1. We therefore must have 
TQ yy > . Since y=x+g(m-1)x  when there are m equal countries, it follows that 
TQ xx > . QED 
 
From the propositions above, it is clear that the following must be true when countries 
are identical: 
 
Proposition 4: If countries are identical, all countries are better  off in the non-
cooperative tax equilibrium than in the non-cooperative quota equilibrium. 
 
Proof: This follows directly from the fact that with identical countries each country 
has more R&D investment and lower emissions in the tax equilibrium than in the 
quota equilibrium. As for the country’s own policy, in both cases R&D expenditure 
and abatement are chosen (directly or indirectly through an appropriate carbon tax) in 
order to maximize the country’s own welfare. Any particular country is cet. par. better 
off the higher are the levels of R&D investments and abatement in other countries. A 
country is thus better off when other countries use taxes than when other countries use 
quotas.
6  QED 
 
 
3.4  Endogenous type of policy 
In Section 3.1 we studied the corner case in which all countries use domestic tradable 
quotas in order to reach the equilibrium emission level. Likewise, in Section 3.2 we 
examined the corner case in which all countries use a carbon tax as their domestic 
instrument. There are, however, more equilibria. First, note that given the choice of 
domestic policy instrument in the other countries, for the last country there is a 
particular abatement level and level of R&D investments that maximize the country’s 
welfare. These levels will of course depend on what other countries do, and in 
                                                 
6 A country could (hypothetically) choose R&D investment and abatement level from the quota 
equilibrium even if other countries use taxes. It would then be better off than if other countries had 
used quotas (and thus had higher emissions and less R&D). Of course, the country is even better off 
when it chooses R&D and abatement according to the tax equilibrium (given that all other countries 
use taxes).    13
particular on how many countries use quotas and how many countries use taxes. But 
whatever the optimal level of R&D investments and abatement are in a country, it 
makes no difference to the country’s welfare whether the appropriate abatement level 
is achieved through the use of quotas or through an appropriate carbon tax. Hence, the 
two Nash equilibria discussed above are only two of many possible Nash equilibria. 
 
The discussion above demonstrates the following proposition: 
 
Proposition 5: If the choice of policy instrument is made simultaneously with the 
magnitude of the instrument (i.e. amount of quotas or rate of the carbon taxes), there 
are multiple Nash equilibria. 
 
Suppose, however, that countries (simultaneously) choose type of instrument (quota 
or tax) in the first stage of a 2-stage game. In the second stage, the level of the 
instrument, as well as R&D expenditures, are (simultaneously) chosen. If countries 
are identical, it follows from the discussion in the end of the previous section that the 
more countries that have chosen tax in stage 1, the higher are R&D expenditures and 
the lower are emissions in stage 2. If country  i chooses tax in stage 1, it induces 
higher R&D expenditures and lower emissions in the other countries than if it had 
chosen quota in stage 1. Moreover, in stage 2 it does not matter for a country whether 
it uses quota or tax as a particular abatement can be reached anyway. All countries are 
aware of these facts in stage 1, and hence all countries choose tax in stage 1. Hence, 
we have the following proposition: 
 
Proposition 6: Assume that all countries are identical. If the choice of policy 
instrument in all countries is made bade before the magnitude of the instrument (i.e. 
amount of quotas or rate of the carbon taxes), there is a unique sub-game perfect 
equilibrium of the 2-stage game, where all countries use carbon taxes to control CO2 
emissions. 
 
Notice that the assumption of identical countries in the above Proposition was needed 
only to guarantee that each country has more R&D investment and lower emissions 
the larger is the number of other countries choosing a tax as their policy instrument. 
This will hold if countries are identical, but it will obviously also hold under much   14
weaker assumptions. Proposition 6 can thus be generalized to a broader set of cases 




4 International agreements 
We consider two types of complete international climate agreements. The first type of 
agreement is a Kyoto type. This agreement specifies the initial distribution of 
emission quotas between countries, but allows countries to buy or sell quotas from/to 
other countries. The agreement imposes no restrictions on how a country sets its 
domestic policy, as long as its emissions does not exceed its quotas (i.e. initial 
endowment adjusted for quotas purchased or sold). 
 
The second type of agreement does not set any direct limits on the emissions of the 
countries. Instead, the agreement specifies policy instruments that the countries must 
implement domestically. Below, we study the case where there is a common domestic 
carbon tax that all countries must implement. 
 
In the simple case where R&D investments for a moment are ignored, both types of 
agreements will in principle give cost-effectiveness, as marginal abatement costs will 
be equalized across countries in both cases.
7 Moreover, with a suitable amount of total 
quotas or a suitable level of the common carbon tax, the condition  (5) for efficient 
abatement can be met. 
 
4.1 Internationally tradable emission quotas 
Assume that country i is given initial emission quotas equal to  i E . Moreover, assume 
that a competitive international market for quotas is established, with an equilibrium 
price p for quotas. Obviously, this price will be higher the smaller is the sum of quotas 
i
i
EE = ￿ . Assume that all countries are small, in the sense that they consider the 
                                                 
7 There are obviously several qualifications. In particular, for the Kyoto type agreement we must 
assume that no country has market power (see e.g. Westskog, 1996) and that domestic policies are 
efficient in the sense that the costs to a country of emitting CO2 (equal to the international quota price) 
are passed on to private agents. With a harmonized carbon tax, we must assume that domestic policy is 
not designed so that the effect of the tax is undermined, see e.g. Hoel (1992a,b; 1993) for a further 
discussion.   15
quota price as independent of their own decisions. We shall discuss this further in the 
end of this section. For a given quota endowment  i E  and a given quota p, country i 
minimizes 
 
  (,)[()] iiiiiiii xCAypNyAE ++--   (14) 
 
subject to (1) and taking R&D expenditures in other countries as given (that is, R&D 
expenditures are determined in a non-cooperative manner). Notice that the 
environmental cost function Di does not appear here, since the sum of emissions are 
given. 
 
The first order conditions for this minimization problem are 
 
 





iA Cp =   (16) 
 
 
The equilibrium price p will of course depend on the sum of quotas  E. The lower  E 
is, the higher will be the quota price. Moreover, in Appendix 1 we show the following 
 
Proposition 7: The higher the quota price p, the higher is abatement and the higher is 
the technology level in all countries. 
 
If the sum of quotas is set so that the quota price is equal to the Pigovian level, i.e. 




D ￿ , it is clear that equation (5) 
from the social optimum will be satisfied. However, the conditions for R&D 







-+ ￿￿  compared with (15). In other words, the positive   16
spillover effects to the countries are ignored under the Kyoto type of climate 
agreement. In Appendix 1 we show that this has the following implication: 
 
Proposition 8: Denote the emission level in country i in the social optimum by 
SO





pDE =￿ , abatement levels and technology levels will be lower in all countries  
in the Kyoto type agreement than in the social optimum. 
 




pD =￿ may seem as a natural choice, it 





pD =￿ , and then reduce the sum of emissions. This will give an 
increase in the quota price p. From Proposition 7 we know that the increase in p will 
imply increased abatement and technology levels. Small changes in abatement levels 
have a second order effect on total social costs, since (5) holds initially. However, 
when the initial equilibrium is given by  (15), it is shown in Appendix 1 (by 
differentiating (3) that social costs are reduced by small changes in R&D expenditures 
that increase all technology levels.  We thus have the following result: 
 
Proposition 9: Under a Kyoto type of agreement, the optimal amount of quotas is 




pD =￿ . 
 
From the discussion above it follows that under a Kyoto type of agreement, the quota 
price should be “high”, that is, the amount of quotas should be “low”, in order to 
adjust for insufficient incentives for the signatories to take technology spillovers into 
account.  
 
We have so far assumed that all countries consider the quota price as given. For a 
country that is so large that it takes into consideration that its decisions influence this 
price we get additional terms in (15) and (16). These are  [()]() iiiii NyAEdpdx ---  
and  [()]() iiiii NyAEdpdA --- , respectively. The size of the terms  i dpdx  and 
i dpdA  will depend on the market structure. The size of the terms  [()] iiii NyAE --    17
will depend on how many quotas large countries buy or sell. In particular, these terms 
will be zero if the initial quota allocation implies that the large countries decide to 
neither buy nor sell quotas. Notice that this will be the outcome if all countries are 




4.2 A harmonized domestic carbon tax 
Assume now that the climate agreement does not specify emission levels for the 
participating countries, but instead requires all countries to introduce a common 
domestic carbon tax  t. Moreover, in each country the carbon tax revenue of the 
government is redistributed domestically. For country i, the abatement level is now 
determined by (10), with ti  replaced by t. Country i minimizes 
 
  ((,),)([()(,)]) iiiiiijjjj
j
xCAyyDNyAy tt ++- ￿   (17) 
 
subject to (1). The optimal choice of R&D expenditures is given by the first order 








=-+--+-- ￿￿   (18) 
 
The two first terms on the r.h.s. of (18) have a straightforward interpretation, see the 
discussion after  (13).  Without any agreement the last term would cancel out: the 
domestic tax rate  i t , which then equals marginal cost of abatement
'
iA C , would be 
equal to marginal benefit of abatement
'
i D , see (8).  However, with an agreement (the 
present case) the common tax rate t  will in general differ from (be higher than) the 
tax rate the country would have chosen without any agreement, that is, the last term in 
(18) is negative. The interpretation is that the larger are R&D expenditures, the larger 
is abatement, i.e. the more is abatement distorted away from the country’s ideal 
choice (given by (8)). This negative consequence of more R&D expenditure must be 
subtracted from the positive effects given by the first two terms.    18
   





D ￿ , it is clear from (9) that equation  (5) from the social 
optimum will be satisfied. However, also in the present case the R&D expenditures 
will generally differ from the socially optimal level, but it is now not obvious whether 
there will be too little R&D compared with the social optimum (as in the case 





D t =￿ , there are three differences between (4) and (18):  










D ￿ , while in  (18) it is 
multiplied by only 
'
i D . This tends to make the r.h.s. of (18) smaller than the 
r.h.s. of (4). 











„ ￿ . It is not clear which of 
these terms is largest. 
•  In (18) there is a negative term 
'' () iiy DA t --  that dose not appear in (4). This 
tends to make the r.h.s. of (18) smaller than the r.h.s. of (4). 
 
From the reasoning above it is clear that we cannot be sure whether (4) or (18) has the 
largest r.h.s. (for given values of abatement and technology levels). If they are 
identical for all countries at the values of abatement and technology levels in the 




D t =￿ . If the r.h.s. of (4) and (18) differ for some or all countries, as they 
generally will, this will usually no longer be true. We can summarize this discussion 
in the following Proposition: 
 
Proposition 10: Under an agreement of a common carbon tax, the optimal carbon tax 




D t =￿ . Whether the optimal tax is 
lower than or higher than the Pigovian level will depend on properties of the 
functions describing the economy.  
   19
 
4.3 A comparison of the two types of agreements 
In this section we compare the two types of international agreements, which also may 
be labelled “quota” and “tax” types of agreements. We have not been able to make a 
general comparison. Instead we have considered the case where all countries are 
identical, and where BAU emission functions and environmental damage functions 
are linear in their arguments over the relevant ranges. We have used the notation 
'
i D =d (>0) and
'
i N =h (<0), and the comparison between the two cases is done for the 
same price of carbon, i.e. p=t.  
 
With the notation above we can rewrite (15) and (18) as 
   
 
' 1(,) y CAypK h =--+   (19) 
   
where K=0 under the quota agreement and  
   
 
' ()[()(1)(1)] y KApmm hdgd =---+--   (20) 
 
under the tax agreement. In Appendix 1 we show the following: 
 
Remark 1: Assume that countries are identical and that BAU emission functions and 
environmental damage functions are linear. If K (given by (20)) is negative (positive) 
the quota agreement gives more (less) R&D expenditure and more (less) abatement 
than the tax agreement.  
 
By assumption, 
' 0 y A h ->. The square brackets in  (20) consist of two terms. The 
second term is positive. The first term is non-negative if  pm d ‡ . Notice that  
pm d =  corresponds to the Pigovian case in which the marginal abatement cost is set 
equal to the sum of the marginal environmental costs. From (20) and Remark 1 we 
thus have the following result: 
   20
Proposition 11: Assume that countries are identical and that BAU emission functions 
and environmental damage functions are linear.  If the price of carbon is at least 
equal to the Pigovian level, then the quota agreement gives more R&D expenditure 
and more abatement (and thus lower emissions) than the tax agreement. 
  
If the price of carbon is sufficiently lower than the Pigovian level, the result above 
will be reversed. This confirms our analysis in Section 3, where we showed that 
without international cooperation, quotas would give lower R&D expenditures and 
higher emissions than taxes (for identical countries). Formally, this follows from (20)
with  p=d, which corresponds to the case of no agreement. With  p=d, we get 
' ()(1) y KAm hgd =--, which is positive if there are R&D spillovers (d>0). If there 
are no such spillovers, of course it then makes no difference whether countries use 
quotas or taxes in their domestic policies when there is no international agreement.  
 
5  Incomplete agreements 
The Kyoto agreement will only cover some of the countries in the world. This is 
likely to be the case for any international agreement: There may always be some 
countries not being willing to sign the agreement. In this chapter we therefore assume 
that there is an aggregate of such countries, which we denote by country 0, in addition 
to the N (signatory) countries of our model. The purpose of this chapter is to see how 
the existence of such an outside country (in reality a group of countries) affects the 
optimal choice of policies in the cooperating countries. 
 
5.1 No explicit abatement in the non-cooperating country 
Assume first that there is no active abatement effort in the non-cooperating countries, 
which may reflect that these countries do not regard the climate problem to be of any 
significance to it. This could also be the reason why the countries are not interested in 
joining an international agreement that aims at reducing CO2 emissions.  
 
Even if there is no abatement effort in the non-cooperating countries, the BAU 
emission level N0 could depend on R&D expenditures in the cooperating countries. 
Formally, assume that N0 is given by the function N0(y0) that has the same properties 










= ￿   (21) 
 
We have thus implicitly assumed that there are no R&D expenditures (of the kind 
relevant for CO2 emissions) in the non-cooperating countries. This is a reasonable 
description of countries that are not concerned about the environmental effect of CO2 
emissions. 
 
For the cooperating countries, total social costs are given by  (3) as before, the only 
difference being that there is an additional term  -  00 () Ny - in the environmental 
damage functions. The social optimum is as before given by (4) and (5), but with the 
summation operator in the second term of (4) starting at 0 instead of 1. 
 
Next, consider an international agreement of the quota type, i.e. the type discussed in 
Section 4.1. Since total emissions are no longer given (incomplete agreement), we 
must include environmental costs in the expression for total costs of country i. Instead 











++--++ ￿   (22) 
 
where y 0 is given by  (21). The first order conditions for the minimization of this 




0 1()() iyii CNpND =-+-+-   (23) 
 
The additional positive term 
''
0 i ND -  on the r.h.s. of (23) implies that there are higher 
R&D expenditures in the present case than in the case without non-cooperating 
countries. However the underinvestment in R&D is no less than before, as the 
existence of non-cooperating countries also augments the r.h.s. of  (4) by a similar 
term. In fact, while 
'
0 N -  is multiplied by the sum of marginal environmental costs for   22
all countries in the social optimum, 
'
0 N -  is multiplied only by the marginal 
environmental costs for country i in (23). Hence, the additional term is largest in the 
social optimum. 
 
Turning to the tax type of agreement discussed in Section 4.2, the only change in the 
minimization problem of a country is that the summation operator in (17) starts at 0 
instead of 1, and A0=0. The first order condition for this problem is given by (18) as 
before, but with the first summation operator starting at 0 instead of 1.  
 
It is thus clear that for both types of agreement, the only change due to non-
cooperating countries is the addition of the term 
''
0 i ND -  on the r.h.s. of the equations 
describing the optimal amount of R&D expenditure. The comparison between the two 




5.2 A quota agreement with a CDM 
Consider the case in which the cooperating countries can induce the non-cooperating 
countries to abate its emissions. Decreased emissions in the non-cooperating countries 
require transfer of money from the cooperating countries to the non-cooperating 
countries, that is, the signatories buy CDM (“Clean Development Mechanism”) 
quotas from the non-cooperating countries. We assume that the price of CDM quotas 








000 (,) A CAy can be interpreted as a supply function of CDM quotas. Hence, 
increased purchase of CDM quotas will increase the quota price (
''
0 0 AA C > ). On the 
other hand, increased R&D expenditures among the signatories, which through 
technology spillovers raise the technology level also in the non-cooperating country, 
lower the quotas price (
''
0 0 Ay C < ).  
   23











+++- ￿￿   (25) 
 
where  0 qA is the payment for abatement in the non-cooperating countries, that is, for 
the purchase of  0 A CDM quotas.  
 
Consider the first best optimum for the group of cooperating countries when the price 
for CDM quotas is equal to the marginal abatement cost in the non-cooperating 
countries. Formally, this optimum is found by minimizing  (25) subject to the 




































+= ￿   (28) 
 
Except for the differences with respect to which countries the summation operator 
includes, (26) and (27) are almost identical to (4) and (5). The only difference is the 
term 
''
00 Ay CA g -  in (26), which is positive, representing reduced payment to the non-
cooperating countries: increased R&D expenditures in the cooperating countries 
lower marginal abatement costs in the non-cooperating countries through 
technological diffusion, and hence the price q of CDM quotas is reduced. 
 
Equation (28) suggests the optimal amount of purchased CDM quotas for the group of 
cooperating countries. Since 
''
00 0 AA AC > , it follows from (27) and (28) that marginal 
abatement costs should be lower in the non-cooperating countries than in the 
cooperating countries. The reason is that it is optimal for the group of cooperating   24
countries to act as a monopsonist towards the non-cooperating countries. By 
purchasing less abatement in the non-cooperating countries than full cost-
effectiveness would suggest, the price of CDM quotas (equal to marginal costs of 
abatement in the non-cooperating countries) is kept down. 
 
We now turn to the case of a Kyoto type of agreement with incomplete participation. 
As in Section 4.1 R&D expenditures are determined by the signatories in a non-
cooperative manner. Let  a0i be the amount of abatement in the non-cooperating 











= ￿   (29) 
 











++---+++ ￿   (30) 
 
Country i takes the prices p and q as given, and wishes to choose xi, Ai and a0i in order 
to minimize its total costs. If q<p all countries want to purchase only CDM quotas. 
However, with no demand for tradable quotas, the price of this type of quota drops, 
and in equilibrium  q=p. On the other hand, if  0 A is given and “low”,  q<p in 
equilibrium. Note that in order to sustain q<p in equilibrium, the amount  0 A  must be 
rationed, that is, the agreement must specify for each cooperating country how much 
abatement it is allowed to purchase in the non-cooperating countries.
8  
 
For an exogenous a0i, the levels of xi and  Ai that minimize the expression above are 
given by (16) and  (23). Comparing these equations with the conditions for a first best 
optimum for the group of cooperating countries, i.e. with (26) and (27), we see that if 
the sum of quotas is set so that the quota price i s equal to the Pigovian level 
                                                 
8 If CDM quotas are traded in a competitive market (not purchased by e.g. a monopsonist), q=p in 





pD =￿ ), it is clear that equation  (27) from the first best optimum of the 
signatories will be satisfied. However, t he technology levels in the cooperating 
countries will also in the present case be lower than what is optimal, as the reasoning 
we gave after (16) is valid also in the present case. In fact, in the present case there is 
even a further distortion, which is due to the last term on the r.h.s. of (26): Individual 
countries take the price q as given, and therefore neglect the price lowering effect of 
their R&D expenditures. The discussion above implies that for the same reason as 
given in Section 4.1, it is also in the present case optimal to set the sum of emissions 
so low that the quota price p is higher than the Pigovian level. 
 
 
The main results of this section can be summarized as follows:  
 
Proposition 12: If the cooperating countries can purchase CDM quotas from the non-
cooperating countries, it is optimal for the group of cooperating countries to act as a 
monopsonist towards the non-cooperating countries and purchase less abatement 
than full cost-effectiveness would suggest. Comparing the first best optimum of the 
group of cooperating countries with the case of an incomplete Kyoto type of 
agreement with CDM quotas, as in Section 4 the Kyoto type is inferior, having too 
low technology levels. 
 
 
6  Concluding remarks 
We we would like to make a few concluding remarks. First, several of our results 
were proved under rather restrictive assumptions, such as identical countries and/or 
specific  properties of the environmental damage functions. However, by considering 
the discussions and the proofs, it is clear that these restrictive assumptions are only 
necessary conditions. The results are thus likely to hold for a much wider class of 
assumptions, although they are not completely general. 
 
Second, we would like to point out an important policy implication of one of our 
results. It is sometimes argued that since we can expect lower abatement costs in the 
future through technological change, current restrictions on greenhouse gas emissions   26
should be moderate. Our analysis has shown that if future technological change is the 
result of deliberate R&D effort, this argument may be misleading: Under a Kyoto type 
of agreement, Proposition 9 suggests that the total amount of quotas should be so 
strict that the price of emission is higher than what would have been optimal in the 
absence of endogenous technological change.     
 
Finally, there are a number of possible extensions of the present paper. The most 
obvious might be the modelling of R&D: In the paper we have assumed that in each 
country R&D expenditures are controlled directly by the government. A more 
adequate modelling would have been to let the government determine policy 
instruments, for example, R&D subsidies, that have impacts on firm’s decisions on 
R&D expenditures. Within such a framework we could study how policy instruments 
affect technology spillovers both between firms in the same countries, and between 
firms in different countries. In addition, the rate of technological diffusion (g )  could 
be endogenous and related to firm characteristics, e.g. level of technology. Hence, a 
topic for future research could be the interplay between policy instruments of different 
countries, firm incentives to undertake R&D investments and the rate of technological 
diffusion.    27
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APPENDIX 1: Proof of Propositions 1, 2, 7, 8, 9 and Remark 1. 
 
Proof of Proposition 1 
Assume the opposite, i.e. that E
T ‡ E
Q  (using superscripts T and Q to denote the tax 
and quota equilibrium, respectively, and letting E denote total emissions). From the 
convexity of the environmental damage functions this implies 
'' ()()
TQ
ii DEDE ‡ . Let  
 
 
''' (,)()() iyiiiiii CAyNyDER +=   (A1) 
 
 
' (,) iAiii CAyS =   (A2) 
 






-+ ￿￿ in (13) are positive, the inequality 
'' ()()
TQ
ii DEDE ‡ implies from (7), (8) and (13) that 
TQ
ii RR >  and 
TQ
ii SS ‡ for all i. 
























=>   (A4) 
where 
 
2''' 0 iiAyiAAiyyiAAii PCCCCDN =--<   (A5) 
 
As noted above, a shift from the quota equilibrium to the tax equilibrium implies that 
0,0,0 iii dMdSdE >‡‡ . It therefore follows from  (A3),  (A4) and  (A5) 
that 0,0 ii dydA >> , that is, 
TQ
ii yy >  and 
TQ
ii AA > for all i, which implies E
T<E
Q. But 
the latter inequality contradicts our initial assumption. QED 
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Proof of Proposition 2 
When  () ijij
jj
DEE d = ￿￿ , the equilibrium condition (8) may be written as 
  (,)0 iAiii CAy d -=   (A6) 
 
       
while the condition (7) for the quota equilibrium and (13) for the quota equilibrium 
may be written as  
 
  1(,)´ iyiiiii CAyNK d ++=   (A7) 
 





=-+> ￿￿  in the tax 
equilibrium. In both equilibria these two equations for country i determine the 
abatement level and the technology level in country i (for a given value of Ki). The 
difference in the two equilibria can be found by comparing the case of Ki=0 with the 




















  (A9) 
where 
 
2 ´´0 iiAAiyyiiAAiiAy HCCCNC d =+->   (A10) 
 
and the signs follow from our assumptions on the abatement cost functions and BAU 
emission functions. It is thus clear that technology levels and abatement levels are 
higher in the non-cooperative tax equilibrium than in the non-cooperative quota 
equilibrium. This completes the proof of Proposition 2. 
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Proof of Proposition 7 





















Øø =--> ºß   (A12) 
 
where Hi is given by (A10) except that di is replaced by p. This completes the proof of 
Proposition 7. 
 






pDE =￿ , the social optimum is given by (15) and (16), except that (15) now 






=-+ ￿￿ . We therefore have exactly 
the same mathematical structure as in the comparison made in the proof of 
Proposition 1. It therefore also follows that compared with the social optimum, 
abatement levels and technology levels will be lower in all countries in the Kyoto type 
of agreement than in the social optimum. This completes the proof of Proposition 8. 
 
Proof of Proposition 9 
Denote social costs (given by (3)) by S. Differentiating the first line of  (3) with 
respect to technology levels gives 
 
 
'' () iiyii ii dSdxCpNdy =++ ￿￿   (A13) 
 
     




pD =￿ . Inserting (15) gives 
  ii ii dSdxdy =- ￿￿   (A14) 
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From (1) we have 
  (1) iji j yxx gg =+- ￿   (A15) 
 
Taking the sum over all m countries gives 
 
  (1)[(1)] iiii iiii ymxxmx gggg =+-=+- ￿￿￿￿   (A16) 
 
The term in square brackets is larger than 1. The sum of technology levels is thus 
proportional to the sum of R&D expenditures, with a proportionality factor that is 
larger than one. When  i idy ￿ is positive, it therefore must be the case that 
ii ii dydx > ￿￿ , implying dS<0. This completes our proof of Proposition 9.  
 
Proof of Remark 1 
Under both types of agreements we have 
 
  (,)0 A CAyp -=  (A17) 
 
Further, condition  (15) for the quota equilibrium and condition  (18) for the tax 
equilibrium may be written as  
 
  1(,) y CAypK h +-=   (A18) 
 
with K=0 under the quota agreement and K given by (20) under the tax agreement. 
Note that (A17) and (A18) have the same mathematical structure as (A6) and (A7). 















  (A20) 
 
and Remark 1 immediately follows. 
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